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Policy-makers have instituted a variety of fuel economy tax policies -- polices that tax or subsidize
new vehicle purchases on the basis of fuel economy performance -- in the hopes of improving fleet
fuel economy and reducing gasoline consumption. This article reviews existing policies and concludes
that while they do work to improve vehicle fuel economy, the same goals could be achieved at a lower
cost to society if policy-makers instead directly taxed fuel. Fuel economy taxation, as it is currently
practiced, invites several forms of gaming that could be eliminated by policy changes. Thus, even
if policy-makers prefer fuel economy taxation over fuel taxes for reasons other than efficiency, there
are still potential efficiency gains from reform.
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sallee@uchicago.edu1 Why do we tax fuel economy?
In recent decades, the United States government has introduced several \fuel economy taxes"
{ that is, taxes or subsidies on the purchase of new consumer automobiles that depend on the
vehicle's fuel economy performance. These policies vary in detail. Some provide subsidies
to vehicles that utilize a specic technology (e.g., hybrids), while others apply to all vehicles
of a given fuel economy. Some levy taxes directly on automakers, while others operate
through the personal income tax system. All attempt to provide automakers and consumers
with an incentive to choose more fuel economical vehicles so as to reduce the consumption
of gasoline. The purpose of this paper is to review the motivation and structure of these
policies, describe their intended and unintended consequences, and distill lessons that may
inform future policy.
The principal economic motivation for the taxation of fuel economy is to correct for
externalities associated with fuel consumption. Fuel economy itself does not create external-
ities, but it indirectly determines the consumption of gasoline, which aects local air quality,
energy security and global climate change. The goal of fuel economy taxation is to cause
consumers to internalize these externalities by raising the price of fuel ineciency.
Policies to reduce energy consumption in the personal transportation sector are an essen-
tial part of energy policy { the sector accounts for 20% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and
40% of petroleum consumption (Environmental Protection Agency 2007). Globally, personal
vehicles will play an expanding role in coming decades because there is a strong relationship
between wealth and vehicle ownership. The extreme is the United States, which had 248 mil-
lion registered motor vehicles in 2008 { equivalent to 1.2 vehicles per driver (U.S. Department
of Transportation 2009). This contrasts sharply with ownership in lower income countries.
In 2007, for every 1,000 residents, the U.S. had 820 registered vehicles, whereas China had
32 (World Bank 2010). As countries like China grow, vehicle ownership will rise rapidly
and policies aimed at mitigating related externalities will become even more important than
they are today. What role should fuel economy taxes play in limiting the consequences of
1growing vehicle ownership? What lessons from the U.S. experience can inform future policy,
both here and abroad?
Several lessons emerge from an analysis of the U.S. experience in fuel economy taxation.
First, fuel economy taxation does have an impact on eet fuel economy. Research on existing
policies shows that taxing inecient cars and subsidizing ecient ones does inuence the
market share of targeted vehicles.
The second lesson, however, is that fuel economy taxation is a less ecient policy for
reducing gasoline consumption than would be direct taxation of gasoline. Fuel economy
taxation shares the weaknesses of fuel economy regulation in that it induces a \rebound
eect" by lowering the cost of driving, which erodes gasoline savings and increases congestion
and accident externalities. In addition, fuel economy taxation and regulation both inuence
only new vehicles, rely on imprecise fuel economy rating systems and maintain a distinction
between passenger cars and light trucks, all of which are disadvantages relative to direct
gasoline taxation. Auxiliary justications sometimes used to make the case for fuel economy
taxation { like consumer fallibility, technological spill-overs or network eects { currently
lack strong empirical evidence.
The third lesson is that fuel economy taxation can be reformed to reduce ineciencies
related to policy gaming, by which consumers and producers improve the tax treatment of
vehicles in ways that have little or no impact on actual fuel consumption. Gaming takes the
form of short-run timing changes { where transactions are accelerated or delayed in order to
take advantage of temporary tax treatments, medium-run vehicle design { where automakers
tweak vehicles to achieve large tax improvements for small fuel economy changes, and long-
run relabeling of passenger cars as light trucks { where automakers can improve tax treatment
by designing vehicles to achieve more generous regulatory classication. Policy makers could
limit gaming on all three of these margins through straightforward policy reform.
The balance of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briey describes an ecient policy for
gasoline-related externalities, a Pigouvian tax. Section 3 describes the various fuel economy
2tax policies that have been used in the United States, with some attention to related policies
in Canada. Section 4 then reviews econometric evidence on the eects of these policies on
vehicle sales and prices. Section 5 lays out arguments regarding the ineciency of fuel econ-
omy taxation relative to direct gasoline taxation. Section 6 reviews the evidence on gaming
in transaction timing, vehicle tweaking, and vehicle reclassication. Section 7 describes the
diculty of designing fuel economy taxation that puts a consistent price on the conservation
of gasoline and the consequences for eciency. Section 8 considers alternative rationales for
fuel economy taxation. Section 9 draws lessons for policy and concludes.
2 The Pigouvian solution to gasoline externalities
Before analyzing the actual practice of fuel economy taxation, it is helpful to establish the
ideal solution to the problem that fuel economy taxation is intended to solve. The canonical
theory of taxation to correct for externalities dates back to Pigou (1932), who showed that
the rst-best allocation of resources in an economy could be provided by a free market given
a tax on the externality-generating good equivalent to the marginal external damages at the
optimal quantity.
To illustrate, consider the case of manufacturers who leach toxic dyes into waterways
as part of their production process. In the absence of policy, all rms will leach dyes if
it lowers their production costs. The Pigouvian policy is to directly tax the externality {
toxic dye. Facing a dye tax, all rms who can modify their production process to eliminate
dye contamination at a cost below the tax will do so. Firms for whom eliminating dye
contamination is more expensive than the tax will continue polluting and pay the tax (or go
out of business).
If the tax is set equal to the marginal damage to society of dye contamination, then this
arrangement will be ecient { manufacturers will stop polluting if and only if doing so is less
costly to society than continuing to pollute. Critical to this eciency is that every individual
3agent faces the same price for the externality.
Gasoline consumption, the target of fuel economy taxation, is slightly more compli-
cated because it generates three distinct externalities. First, greater demand for gasoline
may threaten energy security, which can have political consequences and increase economic
volatility. Second, gasoline consumption releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, which
contributes to climate change. Third, gasoline consumption releases local air pollutants that
have environmental and health implications.
In the rst two cases, a Pigouvian solution is a direct tax on gasoline, because the
externality is directly proportional to the gallons of gasoline consumed, regardless of who
consumes it or how they do so. In the case of local air pollution, however, dierent vehicles
emit dierent levels of emissions depending on engine technology and driving conditions.
Thus, the Pigouvian solution to local air externalities is a tax on emissions, but this is
impractical given current technologies. While a gasoline tax is therefore not fully ecient,
Fullerton and West (2000) estimate that a gasoline tax achieves about two-thirds of the
benets of the optimal tax on emissions, which represents the lion's share of the benets
achievable under the best feasible policy. As a result, the gasoline tax will be used here as
the ecient benchmark for all gasoline externalities.
In spite of these eciency arguments for fuel taxation, gasoline taxes are low in the
United States. This is usually explained as a result of political constraints { raising the
gasoline tax is politically unpopular and therefore infeasible. Instead, the U.S. relies on
other policies for reducing gasoline consumption, including fuel economy regulation and fuel
economy taxation. To mimic the eciency of a gasoline tax, fuel economy policy would
need to place a uniform price on the consumption of gasoline that applied across all vehicles,
automakers, consumers, and time periods. Unfortunately, as argued below, fuel economy
taxation cannot, in theory, achieve this parity, and it has not, in practice, been as ecient
as might be possible. After reviewing the structure of fuel economy tax policies and the
estimates of their impacts, the second half of the paper returns to the issue of eciency
4relative to this Pigouvian benchmark to assess the merits of fuel economy taxation.
3 How do we tax fuel economy?
This section reviews the main fuel economy tax policies in the United States and Canada,
highlighting features that are relevant for further analysis.
3.1 The Gas Guzzler Tax
Fuel economy taxation started in the United States with the Gas Guzzler Tax, which levies
an excise tax on passenger cars that have fuel economy below a certain level. The tax,
which took eect in 1980, was introduced at the same time as Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards and the ocial fuel economy rating program that was necessary
to administer these programs.
The tax phased-in between 1980 and 1991, and it has not changed since. But, because
it is not adjusted for ination, the real value of the tax has gradually fallen over time. The
minimum tax is $1,000 on passenger cars that get below 22.5 miles-per-gallon (mpg), and
any vehicle getting above that fuel economy is free of taxation. The maximum tax is $7,700
for any vehicle with a combined fuel economy rating below 12.5 mpg. The tax schedule is a
step function, as shown in gure 1. Manufacturers remit the tax, and the tax is included as
a line item in the sticker price visible to consumers.
Importantly, the tax applies only to passenger cars, not to light trucks. In practice, this
means that the tax is levied on vehicles that are very expensive and generally low volume.
Table 1 shows that, in 2006, 6.2% of vehicle congurations that are separately rated by the
EPA were subject to a tax, but that these vehicles held only a 0.7% market share. As a
result, the tax raises a modest amount of revenue, around $200 million in recent years. The
taxed models are overwhelmingly made by foreign manufacturers.
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Source: Sallee and Slemrod (2010). Figure includes nominal values. The exchange rate was close to 1 for
much of 2008.
3.2 Income tax benets for clean vehicles
Other fuel economy taxes operate through the personal income tax code. From 2000 to 2005,
consumers who purchased a qualied clean fuel vehicle were able to take a $2,000 above-the-
line tax deduction under the Clean Fuel Vehicle Tax Deduction. In principle, a qualifying
clean fuel vehicle was one that used any of several alternative fuels, including compressed
natural gas, liquied natural gas, liquied petroleum gas, hydrogen or electricity. In practice,
the only vehicles that qualied were gas-electric hybrid vehicles, like the Toyota Prius.
This credit was replaced in 2006 by the Hybrid Vehicle Tax Credit, which aorded new
car buyers a credit, worth up to $3,400 depending on a vehicle's fuel savings. The subsidy
was the sum of two components, a fuel economy credit and a conservation credit. The
6fuel economy credit provided up to $2,400 in $400 increments for a hybrid based on the
percentage increase in its city fuel economy rating relative to the average city fuel economy
for vehicles in the same inertia weight class, the categorization used for emissions testing.
The conservation credit provided up to $1,000 in $250 increments based on the estimated
fuel savings relative to the same benchmark. The credit was non-refundable, and it did not
apply to individuals paying the Alternative Minimum Tax. Compared to the Gas Guzzler
Tax, there were far fewer model congurations that qualied for the subsidy, but they are
much higher volume vehicles so that the overall market share was twice as large in 2006, as
is shown in table 1.
The Hybrid Vehicle Tax Credit featured a phase-out provision. Once a manufacturer sold
60,000 qualifying vehicles, the available credit would be reduced to half the original value
two quarters into the future, and it would be further reduced to one quarter of the original
value six months after that, nally going to zero in two more quarters. This phase out was
reportedly intended to ensure that Toyota and Honda, who sold the best selling hybrids,
did not capture too much government subsidy relative to the domestic automakers (Lazzari
2006). Toyota hit the cap in the second quarter of 2006, and Honda hit the cap in the third
quarter of 2007. Ford, the next best selling hybrid maker, hit the cap in the rst quarter of
2009. This credit is still available today for those manufacturers who have not phased out.
The market share of hybrid vehicles has grown to around 2.7% in 2009, but the number of
vehicles aected by the tax credit has shrunk since 2007 because of the phase out.
The federal government also provides a separate tax credit for plug-in hybrids and all
electric vehicles, like the Chevrolet Volt and Nissan Leaf. This credit ranges from $2,500 to
$7,500 depending on the killowatt hour capacity of the vehicle's battery. This policy also
features a phase-out provision, but it is triggered by the 200,000th vehicle sold across all
manufacturers, rather than being a manufacturer specic trigger. As of the writing of this
article, mainstream qualifying vehicles were not yet available on the market.









U.S. Gas Guzzler Tax (2006) $208 $7,700 6.2% 0.7%
Hybrid Vehicle Tax Credit (2006) ($426) ($3,400) 1.2% 1.6%
Canadian Green Levy (2008) $64 $4,000 14.6% 2.0%
Canadian EcoAuto Rebate (2008) ($95) ($2,000) 3.0% 6.4%
Note: Gas Guzzler Tax revenue based on IRS statistics. U.S. models aected based on EPA fuel economy
data. U.S. market share based on NHTSA data. Canadian revenue data based on Canada Revenue Agency
reports. Canadian models aected based on Natural Resources Canada fuel economy data. Canadian market
share based on JD Power and Associates market data.
3.3 State subsidies for clean fuel vehicles
A number of states have had similar policies aimed at clean fuel vehicles, which in practice
has meant hybrid vehicles. Colorado, Maryland, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Utah and West Virginia have all had a state income tax credit for hybrid vehicles.
In some cases, like Colorado and West Viriginia, this benet was as large as the federal
credit for many vehicles. Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Maine, New Mexico, New
York and Washington have had sales tax exemptions for qualifying hybrid vehicles. Sallee
(Forthcoming) and Gallagher and Muehlegger (2007) describe these policies in more detail.
3.4 Canadian feebate
The Canadian government introduced a limited feebate { a set of taxes (fees) on inecient
models and subsidies (rebates) on ecient cars { in March 2007. The fees and rebates were
introduced simultaneously and designed to roughly oset each other to preserve revenue
neutrality, but the policies were administered as separate programs. The tax side, called
the Green Levy, taxes fuel inecient vehicles between $1,000 and $4,000 depending on their
fuel economy. Like the Gas Guzzler Tax, pick-up trucks are exempt from the tax, but SUVs
and vans are subject to the tax. Consequently, it aects more vehicles than the Gas Guzzler
Tax (as shown in table 1), despite the fact that it exempts vehicles with lower fuel economy
8than its U.S. counterpart (as shown in gure 1). Many of the taxed vehicles are low volume,
however, so the market share of taxed vehicles was still only 2% in 2008. This tax is remitted
by manufacturers.
The rebate side, called the EcoAuto rebate program, gives a subsidy of up to $2,000 to
consumers who purchase a particularly ecient vehicle. This policy is a direct to consumer
rebate program. And, while it inuences only a small number of models, several of these are
popular vehicles, like the Toyota Yaris and Toyota Prius, so the EcoAuto rebate program
applied to an estimated 6.4% of vehicle sales in 2008. The EcoAuto program was introduced
as a temporary program, and it only applied to model year 2006, 2007 and 2008 vehicles.
Unlike the Hybrid Vehicle Tax Credit, the EcoAuto rebate program applies to all vehicles
regardless of any particular fuel technology. Virtually all hybrid vehicles qualify for a subsidy,
but other fuel economic models also qualify. In 2008, 9 out of the 28 models that received a
subsidy were hybrids.
Like their counterparts in the United States, both the Green Levy and the EcoAuto
rebate feature notches. Figure 1 shows that the feebate is a step-function, with discrete
changes in $500 or $1,000 increments made at specic levels of fuel economy. Individual
Canadian provinces have also featured a number of similar tax subsidies for vehicles. These
are discussed in detail in Chandra, Gulati and Kandlikar (2009).
3.5 Scrappage programs
Another brand of fuel economy tax is scrappage rebates. In the United States, the \cash-
for-clunkers" program oered consumers a one time subsidy of either $3,500 or $4,500 for
scrapping an inecient model used as a trade-in during a new vehicle purchase. Trade-ins
were eligible for the subsidy only if the new vehicle had a fuel economy rating suciently
high relative to the trade-in. As such, this program acted as a fuel economy tax. Passenger
cars and light trucks were subject to dierent fuel economy requirements to be eligible, but
these were fairly weak so most trade-ins were eligible. The program was explicitly temporary,
9and it lasted for only a few weeks in July and August of 2009, at a cost of $2.85 billion.
A similar program exists in Vancouver province. Several European nations introduced a
scrappage program during the economic downturn of 2009, but these policies generally did
not have the environmental component of the cash-for-clunkers program and are thus not
fuel economy taxes.
3.6 Key observations about these policies
Several facts about these laws are worth noting. First, taxes tend to be levied on manufac-
turers, whereas subsidies tend to be given directly to consumers, a point which is explored in
the next section. Second, by their very nature, none of these policies places a direct tax on
the targeted externality, but instead tax fuel economy. This deviation from the Pigouvian
ideal has eciency implications which are detailed in section 5. Third, all of these policies
create tax notches { by which small, marginal changes in fuel economy create large, discrete
changes in taxation. These notches introduce incentives that may cause ineciency, as dis-
cussed in section 6. Fourth, all of these policies maintain a distinction between passenger
cars and light trucks, which induce automakers to relabel vehicles as light trucks, as analyzed
in section 6.
Finally, an important caveat is in order. Although the taxes and subsidies per vehicle
have been substantial, no existing policy has applied widely enough to aect a large fraction
of the new vehicle market. Instead, policies have been targeted at narrow bands of vehicles
that represent the extremes of the fuel economy distribution. Lessons from existing programs
should be understood in this context.
4 Intended consequences
This section reviews the existing evidence on who has born the burden of these policies and
whether or not they have succeed in boosting fuel economy.
104.1 Incidence
There is little doubt that a policy which ultimately lowers the nal price to consumers of a
particular automobile will serve to increase the market share of that vehicle. As such, fuel
economy tax policies will inuence quantity demanded, provided that automakers do not
bear the entire burden of the tax. Actual transaction price data in this market are dicult
to come by, so there is relatively little research that measures the incidence of these taxes.
One exception is Sallee (Forthcoming), which examines the incidence of tax credits for the
Toyota Prius. This paper shows that transaction prices for the Toyota Prius were steady
surrounding both large changes in the federal tax credit and changes in state tax policies.
Because consumers later gain a tax benet from the government, constant transaction prices
imply that consumers bear the full burden (enjoy the full benet) of these tax credits.
Sallee (Forthcoming) further argues that this is surprising, because Toyota faced a capacity
constraint and rationed Priuses in this period, implying that they could have appropriated
the gains from the credit. Sallee (Forthcoming) argues that the observed incidence is a
result of Toyota's desire to send a long-run signal to the market that hybrids were aordable
{ this prevented them from raising prices to boost short-run prots. Interestingly, this line
of reasoning suggests that the incidence of the tax credit depended on who was responsible
for remitting the tax, which is usually ruled out by tax theory.
Busse, Silva-Risso and Zettelmeyer (2006) also argue for unconventional tax asymmetry
in the automobile market. They nd that direct to consumer rebates and direct to dealer
rebates from a manufacturer have dierent impacts on nal prices. Busse et al. (2006) nd
that consumers capture nearly all of subsidies of which they are aware, which accords with
ndings in Sallee (Forthcoming) and suggests that consumers bear the incidence of fuel
economy taxation.
Busse et al. (2006) argue that asymmetric incidence is the result of asymmetric infor-
mation { consumers are better informed about direct to consumer rebates and this enables
them to bargain more accurately. While this research examines manufacturer rebates and
11not government policy, the results do suggest that fuel economy tax incidence might depend
on statutory burdens, particularly if taxes are temporary or changing so that information
may not be complete. In a similar vein, Gallagher and Muehlegger (2007) nd suggestive
evidence that state sales tax credits have a greater impact on hybrid sales than do equiva-
lently sized state income tax credits. They attribute this dierence to the relative salience
of these dierent forms of subsidy.
It is not clear how general are the implications from these three studies. Nevertheless,
they do suggest that one of the tenets of tax theory { that economic incidence is independent
of statutory incidence { may not always hold in the taxation of fuel economy. It appears
that, at least under some market conditions, subsidies \stick" to the side of the market where
they are legislated and that salience matters.
Moreover, policy-makers behave as if this is true. As noted above, taxes tend to be
levied on manufacturers, whereas subsidies tend to be given directly to consumers. This is
exemplied by the Canadian feebate program, which introduced two matching policies but
administered them separately, levying the tax on manufacturers but giving the rebate to
consumers. Similarly, the Gas Guzzler Tax is levied on manufacturers, whereas state and
federal subsidies for hybrid vehicles and scrappage subsidies are all direct to consumer.
Policy makers may believe that by giving the subsidy to consumers it is more likely to
benet consumers. Alternatively, they may believe that even if economic incidence ultimately
does not depend on remittance structure, it is still the case that they are more likely to
receive political credit for subsidies that are more visible to consumers. Taxes, unpopular
with voters, may be better laundered through the manufacturer while rebates, popular with
voters, should be out in the open and freely associated with government.
4.2 Evidence on the sales impact of fuel economy taxation
Provided that fuel economy tax policies do inuence the price of vehicles, theory predicts
that they will inuence the relative market share of aected models and thereby change
12eet fuel economy and ultimately gasoline consumption. This is indeed what the existing
literature nds.
Gallagher and Muehlegger (2007) use a panel regression approach to estimate the sales
impact of state tax subsidies for hybrid vehicles. Their baseline results indicate that the
average impact of state subsidies on sales is equivalent to a 20% increase in hybrid market
share. Chandra et al. (2009) do a similar analysis in Canada, using variation in provincial
subsidies for hybrids in a panel estimation framework. They nd evidence that tax subsidies
do indeed have noteworthy impacts on the diusion of hybrid vehicles, as they attribute 26%
of hybrids sold to the policy. This translates into an average of $195 of government revenue
used per ton of carbon dioxide emissions reduced.
Beresteanu and Li (Forthcoming) build an equilibrium model of the new car market and
use the estimated parameters to infer the eects of policy on hybrid vehicle sales, rather than
attempting to use observed changes surrounding the advent of a policy. They conclude that
tax credits for hybrids accounted for 20% of hybrid sales in 2006, and they estimate that
these policies created greenhouse gas emissions reductions equivalent to 1 ton of emissions
per $177 of government revenue.
Li, Linn, Spiller and Timmins (2010) evaluate the recent \cash-for-clunkers" program,
which subsidized fuel economy by providing a subsidy for new car transactions where a
trade-in that had suciently low fuel economy relative to the new car was scrapped by the
dealer after the sale. They conclude that this policy did inuence overall sales and shift the
market towards more fuel ecient vehicles. They estimate that the policy achieved carbon
dioxide reductions at a revenue cost between $91 and $301 of per ton.
Despite using dierent methodologies, examining dierent policies, and studying two
dierent countries, all of this research achieves consensus on two points. First, fuel economy
taxation does have a signicant impact on the market share of aected vehicles. These
policies do inuence the fuel economy of new vehicles, and this does have a subsequent
impact on gasoline consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. But, second, this comes at
13a large revenue cost { with the minimum estimate being $91 and the average closer to $150
or $200 per ton.
To put these estimates in context, the price of a ton of carbon dioxide on the European
Emissions Trading Scheme exchange was around e15 ($19) in July 2010, and the historic
high was around e30 ($38). Osets for sale on the Chicago Climate Exchange are even
cheaper, with recent prices under $5. Congressional Budget Oce scoring of the Waxman-
Markey bill suggested that equilibrium carbon prices in 2019 would only reach $26 under the
bill (Congressional Budget Oce 2009). Some published estimates of the optimal carbon
price are higher, including the oft-cited Stern Report, which argues for a carbon price as
high as $85 per ton of carbon dioxide (Stern 2006). It has been shown that this high price is
driven by unorthodox assumptions about discounting in distant years, but Weitzman (2007)
argues that the same large values can be justied under normal discounting if the parametric
uncertainty surrounding catastrophic climate change is included.
Regardless, even the highest estimates of carbon prices fall short of the revenue outlay
estimates from the literature. It is not surprising to nd that fuel economy taxes are an
inecient means of reducing gasoline consumption because they are a signicant departure
from a Pigouvian tax on gasoline. These eciency considerations are the subject of the next
section.
5 Fuel economy taxation is a blunt instrument for re-
ducing gasoline consumption
As a tool for correcting gasoline consumption externalities, fuel economy taxation has several
drawbacks. These drawbacks are common to both fuel economy taxation and fuel economy
regulation, the latter of which has been studied extensively by economists (see Anderson,
Parry, Sallee and Fischer (2010) for a survey). This section reviews these ineciencies and
describes how the interaction of fuel economy regulation and fuel economy taxation further
14complicates matters.
Economists typically model consumer welfare from vehicles as a function of miles driven
and vehicle attributes. Consumers do not directly value fuel economy, instead they value it
indirectly because it allows them to drive more miles at the same fuel cost. This is represented
in equation 1, which shows that the cost of driving in dollars-per-mile dpm is equal to the





A policy that raises fuel economy without changing the price of fuel lowers the price of
driving, which induces people to drive more. This additional driving, which is often called
the \rebound eect", counteracts some of the gasoline savings that arise from improved
fuel economy. In contrast, a tax on gasoline raises the price of driving. This dierence is
important. The best estimates from recent years indicate that this rebound eect erodes
about 10% of the value of increased fuel economy (Small and Van Dender 2007), making fuel
economy taxation less ecient than direct taxation of fuel.
A tax on gasoline also diers from fuel economy taxation because a gasoline tax aects
both new and used cars. Cars are durable goods, with an average lifespan of 14 years in the
United States. A change in gasoline taxes aects new and used cars alike, but a change in
fuel economy taxation has no direct eect on used vehicles.
These limitations relative to gasoline taxation are common to both fuel economy taxes
and fuel economy regulation. Standard conclusions show that fuel economy regulation is
substantially more costly per gallon of gasoline saved. For example, Austin and Dinan
(2005) estimate the welfare costs of reducing gasoline over a 14 year period via a gasoline
tax increase and via an increase in CAFE and conclude that CAFE costs three times more
per gallon conserved.
155.1 Fuel economy taxation exacerbates mileage externalities
These problems are greatly exacerbated by the fact that there are externalities related not
only to gasoline consumption but also to miles driven. When one individual drives an
additional mile, it has a negative impact on others by increasing the probability of accidents
and congestion. Increasing fuel economy lowers gasoline consumption, but it raises miles
driven, so the net welfare eect of the externality change could be positive or negative,
depending on magnitudes. Estimates of the externalities from congestion and accidents tend
to be quite large relative to national security and climate change, and some analysis shows
that current fuel economy standards are in fact too high (Harrington, Parry and Walls 2007;
Anderson and Sallee Forthcoming).
5.2 Interactions with regulation may negate the benets of taxa-
tion
Fuel economy tax policies in the United States do not operate in isolation. By all accounts,
Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards are the most important policy inuencing fuel
economy in the United States. CAFE standards require each automaker to maintain a
minimum average fuel economy in each model year. Automakers who fail to meet the
minimum are subject to nes. Automakers who greatly exceed the minimum standard are
not incentivized by the program at all, since the standard is not binding for them. But,
for those near the standard, the policy causes automakers to boost fuel economy either by
changing the mix of vehicles sold or by boosting the fuel economy of existing models. In
practice, the domestic automakers appear to be bound by these minimum standards, whereas
Asian automakers have a signicant cushion and most European automakers fail to comply
and instead pay nes.1
For rms bound by the standard, a fuel economy tax may have no net impact on eet fuel
1Detailed evidence on compliance is provided in Anderson and Sallee (Forthcoming).
16economy, even if it causes the automaker to sell fewer taxed (or more subsidized) vehicles.
To see how, imagine an automaker who makes only three vehicles, named for their fuel
economy { the Guzzler (which has fuel economy below the standard), the Standard (which
has fuel economy equal to the standard), and the Hybrid (which has fuel economy above
the standard). To comply with CAFE, some minimum number of Hybrids must be sold for
each Guzzler. If the CAFE constraint is binding on the rm, this means that the rm is
selling this minimum ratio of Hybrids to Guzzlers { it would like to sell more Guzzlers but it
is constrained by the regulation. In this situation, the CAFE constraint creates an implicit
subsidy for Hybrids and an implicit tax on Guzzlers.
Now suppose that an explicit fuel economy tax is levied on Guzzlers, and the number
of Guzzlers sold falls as a result. This will relax the CAFE constraint, which removes
the implicit subsidy for Hybrids, causing the automaker to sell fewer Hybrids. If Hybrid
sales fall enough, the CAFE constraint will again be binding, in which case no change in
average fuel economy will result. (Total sales may rise or fall depending on the behavior
of Standards. This has the additional surprising implication that CAFE could potentially
increase total automobile sales.) The same logic applies to the introduction of a subsidy for
Hybrids { it may have no impact on average fuel economy if Hybrid sales increases are oset
proportionally by Guzzler sales increases.2
This limitation will generally not apply to automakers who are not bound by CAFE
standards. Since European automakers are the primary makers of gas guzzlers and Asian
automakers are the primary makers of hybrids, this consideration has probably not played
a dominant role in the eects of fuel economy taxes in the past. But, it does imply that
the transition of the domestic automakers out of the market for sedans subject to the Gas
Guzzler Tax (discussed further below) does not imply that the Gas Guzzler Tax had an
impact on eet fuel economy, because these automakers are CAFE constrained. And, going
2A related problem is analyzed by Goulder, Jacobsen and van Benthem (2009), who show that a state
which introduces a fuel economy standard in the context of a binding national standard may have little nal
eect on gasoline consumption.
17forward, CAFE standards are scheduled to increase dramatically, which may make standards
binding for Asian automakers as well as domestic ones. In addition, many expect the ne
structure to change signicantly so that many European automakers may switch from paying
nes to achieving compliance. As such, in the future, the interaction between fuel economy
taxes and CAFE regulation is likely to create a situation in which fuel economy taxation
will often inuence the sales of particular vehicles without having any net impact on eet
fuel economy.
In sum, because fuel economy taxation does not directly tax the targeted externality, it
fails to achieve the eciency of a Pigouvian tax. This ineciency is common to fuel economy
taxation and regulation. Moreover, the interaction of fuel economy taxation and regulation
will sometimes imply that fuel economy taxation has no impact at all. These problems
are theoretical and cannot easily be solved by redesigning fuel economy tax programs. In
contrast, the next section deals with ineciencies that stem from the details of existing fuel
economy tax policies, which could be eliminated through straightforward reform.
6 Notches in fuel economy taxation engender gaming
All existing fuel economy tax policies feature notches { points in the tax schedule where
marginal changes in fuel economy correspond to large changes in tax treatment. These
notches create several gaming opportunities, where gaming is dened as action that improves
tax status but has little or no impact on gasoline consumption. In the short run, tax
changes that are anticipated induce timing responses, whereby transactions are shifted into
the high-subsidy or low-tax time period. In the medium run, automakers make very minor
modications to vehicles that lie very close to a fuel economy notch in order to receive more
favorable tax treatment. In the long run, vehicles are redesigned in order to take advantage
of the favorable treatment of light trucks relative to passenger cars. Should they desire to
continue to tax fuel economy, policy-makers can improve the eciency of their policies by
18being attentive to these responses.
6.1 Timing notches cause intertemporal shifting
Some fuel economy tax policy changes are known in advance. The Clean Fuel Vehicle Tax
Deduction became the more generous Hybrid Vehicle Tax Credit on January 1, 2006. This
tax change was passed into law in August of 2005, and consumers who were aware of the
looming change were able to delay their purchases to take advantage of the more generous
credit.
Sallee (Forthcoming) shows this intertemporal bunching for the Toyota Prius surrounding
changes in the federal tax treatment. This exercise is extended here to include all hybrid
vehicles.3 Figure 2 shows the distribution of hybrid vehicle sales (solid line) in the two
months surrounding the tax change and the distribution of non-hybrids over the same time
period (dashed line). The overall pattern of sales follows a predictable selling cycle. Few
vehicles are sold on Sundays, and many more are sold on Fridays and Saturdays. More
vehicles are also sold at the end of a month or quarter, as automakers try to hit quantity
targets.
For all eligible vehicles, the credit available in January 2006 was more generous than the
deduction available in December 2005. We would thus expect to see more hybrid vehicles
sold in January, which is exactly what appears in the top panel of gure 2. In the bottom
panel, gure 2 also shows the same two months in the previous calendar year, when there
was no change in tax policy. This shows that the additional hybrids sold in early January
are not a pattern that obtain in other years, bolstering the conclusion that this bunching is
due to the tax policy.
During the available sample period for the data, Toyota models experienced two addi-
tional changes as the credit phased out. All credits fell by 50% of their value on October
1, 2006, and they fell again to 25% of their original value on April 1, 2007. Figures 3 and
3Data come from a nationally representative sample of transactions from an industry source. See Sallee
(Forthcoming) for details.
19Figure 2: Shifting of Hybrid Transactions into Tax Preferred Time Period: December and
January














































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Distribution of Sales December 2005 and January 2006 (Hybrids 
and All Other Vehicles) 
All  Hybrids 
Tax Credit Worth Up To $3150  Tax Deduction Worth  
$2000 * Marginal Tax Rate 
($500 to $700) 
Tax Deduction Ends 
Tax Credit Begins 
1/1/06 














































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Distribution of Sales December 2004 and January 2005 (Hybrids 
and All Other Vehicles) 
All  Hybrids 
Tax Deduction Worth  
$2000 * Marginal Tax Rate 
($500 to $700) 
Tax Deduction Worth  
$2000 * Marginal Tax Rate 
($500 to $700) 
Note: The \hybrids" series includes all hybrids, regardless of manufacturer, that were eligible for a tax credit.
For all of these vehicles, the introduction of the tax credit increased the real value of the tax benet, but the
amount of this change varies across vehicles. The \all" series includes all vehicles sold in the market that
did not qualify for a hybrid tax benet.
20Figure 3: Shifting of Hybrid Transactions into Tax Preferred Time Period: September and
October













































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Distribution of Sales September 2006 and October 2006 (Toyota 
Hybrids and All Other Vehicles) 
All  Toyota Hybrids 
Half Tax Credit 
Available for Toyota 
Hybrids (up to $1575) 
Full Tax Credit Available for 
Toyota Hybrids (Up to 
$3150) 
Tax Credit Falls 













































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Distribution of Sales September 2005 and October 2005 (Hybrids 
and All Other Vehicles) 
All  Toyota Hybrids 
Tax Deduction Worth  
$2000 * Marginal Tax Rate 
($500 to $700) 
Tax Deduction Worth  
$2000 * Marginal Tax Rate 
($500 to $700) 
Note: The \Toyota hybrids" series includes only Toyota hybrids { all other manufacturers experienced no
tax change in October 2006. Toyota hybrids all experienced a 50% reduction in the value of the tax credit on
October 1, 2006. Hybrids made by other manufacturers, and all non-hybris, are included in the \all" series.
21Figure 4: Shifting of Hybrid Transactions into Tax Preferred Time Period: March and
April






























































































































































































































































Figure 2: Distribution of Sales September 2006 and October 2006 (Toyota 
Hybrids and All Other Vehicles) 
All  Toyota Hybrids 
Quarter Tax Credit 
Available for Toyota 
Hybrids (up to 
$787.50) 
Half Tax Credit Available for 
Toyota Hybrids (Up to 
$1575) 
Tax Credit Falls 






























































































































































































































































Figure 2: Distribution of Sales March 2006 and April 2006 (Toyota Hybrids 
and All Other Vehicles) 
All  Toyota Hybrids 
Full Tax Credit Available for 
Toyota Hybrids (Up to 
$3150) 
Full Tax Credit Available for 
Toyota Hybrids (Up to 
$3150) 
Note: The \Toyota hybrids" series includes only Toyota hybrids { all other manufacturers experienced no
tax change in April 2007. Toyota hybrids all experienced a 50% reduction in the value of the tax credit
(down to one-quarter of the original amount) on April 1, 2007. Hybrids made by other manufacturers, and
all non-hybris, are included in the \all" series.
224 show the same distributional gures for those time periods. In this case, the incentive is
to accelerate transactions into the earlier month. This pattern again emerges. It is absent
in the bottom panels of these gures, which show the same distributions in the prior year
when there were no tax changes.
This timing response is important for two reasons. First, if policy evaluators mistake such
intertemporal shifting for permanent sales responses, they may overstate the eect of the
policy. A simple before-after comparison of the number of vehicles sold after the tax subsidy
increased would overstate the impact of the policy on the relevant externalities. Second,
this intertemporal shifting is scally wasteful; it increases the scal outlay without putting
extra hybrids on the road. The Canadian feebate program was introduced as a surprise and
subsequently did not witness the same shifting. Where possible, revenue can be saved via
the element of surprise, though it should be noted that automakers complained of being
ill-prepared for the Canadian policy.
6.2 Notches cause small manipulations of fuel economy
Timing responses are a short-run phenomenon. In the medium run, fuel economy tax notches
create incentives for automakers to \tweak" vehicle design in ways that have very small
impacts on fuel economy but large tax implications. It takes several years to design a new
automobile or to change core characteristics of a body or engine. Over the course of a few
months, however, minor design decisions can be made that change fuel economy by .1 or
.2 mpg { like vehicle light-weighting, the addition of aerodynamic features like spoilers or
belly-pans, and tire modication to change rolling resistance. When automakers discover
that a vehicle is very close to a tax notch, they may be able to modify the vehicle to improve
its tax status through such means.
Sallee and Slemrod (2010) show that automakers do indeed respond to such incentives
in the U.S. Gas Guzzler Tax, the U.S. fuel economy label rating program and the Canadian
feebate program. They show that the distribution of decimal ratings of vehicles subject to




















































Gas Guzzler Decimal: All Vehicles, 1980 - 2009 (N=1,477) 
Source: Sallee and Slemrod (2010). Data come from the Internal Revenue Service. Total sample size is
1,477. Tax liability falls at the .5 category. In 1980, 1981, 1983 and 1985, tax liability changed at whole
integers (the .0 category) rather than at half-integers (the .5 category), so observations from those years are
shifted to make the notch location consistent.
the Gas Guzzer Tax and fuel economy labels shows signicant bunching on the tax preferred
side. Gas Guzzler Tax liability falls at every .5 decimal { 13.5 mpg, 14.5 mpg, etc. If
automakers respond to these incentives by making minor modications to vehicles that are
just below a tax notch (at 13.4 mpg, 14.4 mpg, etc.), then we would expect to nd relatively
few vehicles that, in the end, have a fuel economy rating ending in .3 or .4, and many with
a fuel economy rating ending in .5 and .6.
Figure 5, replicated from Sallee and Slemrod (2010), shows the distribution of fuel econ-
omy rating decimals for vehicles subject to the Gas Guzzler Tax over its entire history. As
predicted, there are many more vehicles with fuel economy ratings ending in .5 or .6 mpg,
which means that they are just on the tax-preferred side of a notch. This suggests that
24automakers make small modications to vehicles that happen to be just below a tax notch,
but they do not apply those same changes to vehicles that happen to be further away.
The welfare implications of this behavior are negative because this medium-run tweaking
corresponds to design choices that make very small improvements in fuel economy in order to
generate very large changes in tax treatment. Sallee and Slemrod (2010) estimate that the net
impact of these local manipulations amount to a negative welfare impact equal to three times
the positive welfare impact that can be expected from a smooth, ideal Pigouvian tax. While
notched tax schedules may be simpler to legislate, they create negative welfare implications
from this medium-run manipulation, which would not exist in a smooth schedule.
6.3 Policies invite relabeling of vehicles as light trucks
In the medium run when engine characteristics and body style are xed, automakers have
a limited menu of options for changing fuel economy. In the long run, they can modify
the engine, transmission and core body characteristics in response to policy. These long-
run changes are the intended eects of the policy, but a further unintended consequence
stems from the distinction between passenger cars and light trucks. Because light trucks
receive more favorable treatment under CAFE and are exempt from the Gas Guzzler Tax,
automakers have an incentive to relabel cars as trucks whenever possible.
The regulatory denition of a light truck is a vehicle that is a \truck derivative" (hence a
truck) that has gross vehicle weight and curb weight below specic thresholds (hence light).
The denition of a truck derivative is not precisely dened in the statute, but in practice
vehicles built on a truck chassis that have truck characteristics (like four-wheel drive, at
beds, and a higher clearance that facilitates o-road driving) are deemed trucks.
Consequently, all minivans and SUVs are classied as light trucks, and a variety of other
vehicles like Subaru station wagons, the Chrysler PT Cruiser and Chevrolet HHR also qualify.
Three waves of vehicle design have achieved a transformation of the passenger car versus
light truck share of the market. First, minivans supplanted station wagons and large sedans
25as the modal family car starting in the late 1980s. Second, SUVs further displaced higher-
end sedans in the 1990s. Third, so-called cross-overs, almost all of which qualify as light
trucks, are currently rising in market share, further displacing sedans. Overall, light trucks
now account for roughly half of the personal vehicle market, whereas they were a modest
10% in 1978.
The precise nature of this transition suggests automaker attention to fuel economy tax-
ation. Figure 6 shows the relationship between curb weight (a common measure of vehicle
size) and fuel economy (using the Gas Guzzler Tax rating value) for passenger cars in 1984
(the earliest year with available data) and 2004. Each circle or square in the gure represents
a CAFE rated vehicle conguration, and the size of the shape indicates sales volume. The
solid lines are quadratic regression lines. In 1984, the Gas Guzzler Tax was still phasing-in,
and vehicles were taxed only if their fuel economy was below 19. Once fully phased-in, the
Gas Guzzler Tax applied a minimum $1,000 tax to all vehicles getting 22.5 mpg or below,
and the gure has a vertical line to indicate this cut-o.
Figure 6 shows that fuel economy technology improved { a vehicle of the same weight in
2004 had signicantly higher fuel economy than in 1984. In 1984, there are very few vehicles
getting below 19 mpg, the cuto for the Gas Guzzler Tax. This discontinuity shifts sharply
to 22.5 mpg, the new tax cuto, in 2004, by which time passenger cars getting below 22.5
mpg had all but disappeared.
Figure 7 shows the same gure, but it includes both passenger cars and light trucks. Once
light trucks are included, there is no apparent drop-o in vehicles getting below 22.5 mpg
in 2004. There does appear to be technological improvement { the schedule is shifted out
{ but there is no movement away from low fuel economy vehicles around the Gas Guzzler
Tax. One explanation is that automakers have continued to sell heavy vehicles to consumers
willing to pay for size, but they have avoided the tax by transforming these vehicles into light
trucks. Figure 7 does suggest a discontinuity in the entire vehicle market at 19 mpg in 1984.
This is consistent with the idea that it takes several years to make the vehicle classication
26Figure 6: Curb Weight and Fuel Economy in 1984 and 2004: Passenger Cars
Source: Sallee and Slemrod (2010).
changes exhibited later.
Figure 8 presents a dierent way to show a similar result. This gure plots the market
share of vehicles that get between 20 and 22.5 mpg for passenger cars and all vehicles (cars
and trucks combined). The car series shows the near extinction of vehicles in that fuel
economy category. But, the rise of light trucks that get between 20 and 22.5 mpg almost
completely osets this trend over the period.
In a simple Pigouvian framework of gasoline conservation, there is no justication for
treating light trucks and passenger cars separately. If either vehicle type generates a negative
social externality by consuming gasoline, the ecient response is to tax that gasoline at the
Pigouvian level. The same intuition holds for taxing fuel economy. The preference given
27Figure 7: Curb Weight and Fuel Economy in 1984 and 2004: Passenger Cars and Light
Trucks
Source: Sallee and Slemrod (2010).
to light trucks has created a long-run design distortion that causes costly vehicle redesign
and manipulation that improves tax treatment without necessarily improving (and perhaps
harming) the targeted outcome { gasoline consumption.
7 Taxes do not put a consistent price on gasoline con-
servation
As described above, the ideal Pigouvian tax is ecient because it places a consistent tax on
the consumption of a gallon of gasoline so that all consumers and producers face a common
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Source: Author's calculations of NHTSA data.
incentive to reduce consumption. Fuel economy taxation, however, faces several obstacles
to achieving this incentive parity. To understand why, it is helpful to rst describe the
relationship between fuel economy and gasoline consumption.
The number of gallons of gasoline consumed by a vehicle g can be written as the number





Because mpg is in the denominator, the relationship between gasoline consumption and fuel
economy is nonlinear { the gasoline conserved by a unit increase in fuel economy depends
29on the starting level of fuel economy. This relationship can be described by the derivative of






which shows that a one mpg improvement in fuel economy has a greater impact on gasoline
consumption when fuel economy is lower. Note that this would not be true if fuel econ-
omy were written as gallons-per-mile. Much of the rest of the world rates fuel economy
in liters-per-hundred-kilometers, which inverts the distance-consumption relationship and
makes consumption linear in fuel economy.
Laboratory experiments suggest that consumers are confused by this nonlinearity { they
tend to believe that marginal increases in mpg are more valuable for vehicles with high
mpg ratings (Larrick and Soll 2008). This dierence can be quite large. For purposes
of illustration, suppose that all cars are driven 120,000 miles in their lifetime, which is
the assumption used in calculating conservation in the Hybrid Vehicle Tax Credit. The
number of gallons of gasoline conserved by a 1 unit increase in fuel economy is therefore
120;000=mpg 120;000=(mpg+1). Figure 9 shows how this conservation value varies across
the fuel economy distribution. Vehicles, like the Toyota Prius, at the extreme of the fuel
economy distribution conserve less than 10% of the gasoline from a 1 unit increase in mpg
that is conserved by a vehicle, like the Chevrolet Silverado, at the low end. The variation
in the middle is signicant as well { a 1 mpg improvement for a Volkswagen Jetta that gets
25 mpg represents about twice as many gallons of gasoline as the same improvement for a
Honda Civic that gets 35 mpg. Put dierently, the Prius fuel economy would need to rise
by 16 mpg to match the lifetime fuel savings of a 1 mpg increase in the Silverado.
To create a common tax on gasoline consumption across relevant actors, the tax on fuel
economy cannot be the same cost per unit of fuel economy when rated as miles-per-gallon.
Nor can it be a linear function of the percentage improvement in fuel economy. Instead, it
30Figure 9: Gasoline Conserved By One Mile Per Gallon Improvement in Fuel Economy for
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 ﾠVictoria	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 ﾠJe a	 ﾠ
Honda	 ﾠCivic	 ﾠ Toyota	 ﾠPrius	 ﾠ
Note: Example vehicles taken from 2006 EPA fuel economy data le. Ratings are the in-use shortfall adjusted
combined highway and city ratings.
must be a nonlinear function.
In practice, fuel economy taxes have done a poor job of creating this consistency for
two reasons. First, because these policies all feature notches, the implicit subsidy for small
improvements in fuel economy will be zero for some vehicles (because the improvement is too
small to move the vehicle into the next tax tier) and large for others. Figure 10 illustrates
these eects for the Gas Guzzler Tax by showing the tax reduction per gallon of gasoline
conserved (assuming a lifetime of 120,000 miles) for vehicles with dierent starting fuel
economy values assuming rst a .5 mpg increase and second a .1 mpg increase. Notches
create three types of inconsistencies visible in this gure.
31Figure 10: Gas Guzzler Tax Change Per Gallon of Gasoline Conserved for Two Dierent
Fuel Economy Improvements
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Ini al	 ﾠFuel	 ﾠEconomy	 ﾠ
Note: Gasoline conservation is calculated assuming all vehicles are driven 120,000 miles in their life.
First, since notches are all at .5 mpg in the tax, a .5 mpg fuel economy improvement for a
vehicle with a fuel economy rating ending in .5 - .99 will see no tax change from implementing
the improvement. The resulting tax change is therefore 0, even though gasoline is conserved,
and this creates the jagged schedule shown. Second, because the tiers of the Gas Guzzler
Tax are not written to exactly equate tax changes with gasoline conserved, the amount of
subsidy varies across notches, most notably with the last notch at 22.5 mpg, which is worth
$1,000. Third, the tax change per gallon conserved is dierent depending on the size of
the fuel economy improvement. This can be seen by comparing parts (a) and (b) in gure
10, which shows that the tax improvement per gallon conserved is much higher for small
fuel economy improvements that trigger a tax change than for larger improvements. The
Pigouvian ideal would subsidize a gallon of conserved gasoline at a constant level in all
situations. Notched schedules, like the Gas Guzzler Tax, create capriciously varying tax
incentives. This is inecient because automakers will install fuel economy improvements on
vehicles close to notches and they will not do so on vehicles far away from notches, even
though the social benets are equivalent.
32Figure 11: Gallon of Gasoline Conserved Per Dollar of Subsidy Under Hybrid Vehicle Tax
Credit for Two Dierent Vehicle Classes
Source: Author's calculations.
The second reason that fuel economy taxes have created inconsistent incentives is that
some subsidies are based on a vehicle's proportional improvement in fuel economy over a
baseline. The Hybrid Vehicle Tax Credit has this feature. It includes both a conservation
credit, which is a (notched) subsidy for gallons of gasoline conserved, and a fuel economy
improvement credit, which is a (notched) subsidy based on the percentage improvement in
fuel economy. To determine fuel economy improvement and gasoline conserved, the legisla-
tion uses as a benchmark the average city fuel economy of vehicles in the same inertia weight
class { a designation used in determining fuel economy.
Because fuel economy improvement is nonlinearly related to gasoline conserved, the credit
creates a highly variable subsidy per gallon of gasoline conserved, which is illustrated in gure
3311. Figure 11 rst shows the amount of the subsidy as a function of the vehicle's fuel economy
improvement over the baseline. This is a notched schedule. Next, the gure plots the number
of gallons conserved per dollar of subsidy as a function of fuel economy improvement for two
sample vehicles { one a heavy vehicle with an inertia weight class of 5,500 pounds and the
other a lighter-weight vehicle with an inertia weight class of 3,000 pounds. The notches
create a \saw-toothed" per gallon subsidy, which is declining as the vehicle gains larger
subsidies. Because percentage improvements in fuel economy have a larger eect on gasoline
consumed at lower levels of fuel economy but the subsidy is (notched) linear, this saw-tooth
is declining in fuel economy improvement.
Moreover, because vehicles with lower fuel economy save more gasoline for a given per-
centage improvement in fuel economy, the heavier vehicle's schedule lies above the lighter
vehicle's, which demonstrates that more gasoline is saved per dollar of tax credit for heavier
vehicles. The position of two actual vehicles is noted. The Chevrolet Silverado Four-Wheel
Drive Hybrid vehicle belongs in the 5,500 lbs weight class, and it achieves a 25% improve-
ment in fuel economy over its baseline. Over 120,000 miles, this equates to 1,621 gallons of
gasoline saved. The truck qualies for a $400 subsidy, equivalent to 4.0 gallons of gasoline
per dollar of subsidy. In contrast, the Toyota Prius, which is the in the 3,000 lbs weight class,
is a 150% improvement over its benchmark, earning a $2,500 subsidy. The Prius conserves
2,744 gallons of gasoline { which is less than twice the Silverado's savings, yet it gains six
times the subsidy. As a result, the Prius only conserves 1.1 gallons of gasoline per dollar of
government revenue expended.
The point of this exercise is to illustrate that fuel economy taxation does not create
consistent incentives for the conservation of gasoline. Instead, it creates incentives for im-
provement that vary signicantly across vehicles based on their initial fuel economy and the
size of the improvement. An ecient policy would create constant incentives, but this is
dicult to do when fuel economy is used as the basis for taxation because fuel economy's
relationship to gasoline consumption is complicated.
347.1 Fuel economy ratings are imprecise
Adding to the challenge of creating ecient fuel economy taxation is the fact that the fuel
economy ratings upon which the policies are based are themselves far from perfect. Fuel
economy ratings cannot accurately reect the on-road fuel economy of individual consumers
because individual driving behavior inuences fuel performance. Speed, acceleration, hard-
braking, cargo load and external factors all have a signicant impact on realized fuel economy.
The dierence between EPA's city and highway test procedures hints at the importance
of this variation. All vehicles are tested separately on a city and highway course, and, on
average, the city fuel economy is 19% lower than highway fuel economy. This dierence is as
large as the dierence between a Volkswagen Jetta and a Ford Crown Victoria. The realized
fuel economy of someone who drivers a vehicle primarily in stop-and-go urban trac is very
dierent than the fuel economy of someone else who drives an identical vehicle primarily
on uncongested highways. Fuel economy tax policy has no way of accounting for these
dierences { it must treat these two vehicles the same.
Even ignoring individual heterogeneity, fuel economy ratings may be inaccurate on aver-
age. One reason is that actual fuel economy may erode over time as a vehicle ages. Another
reason is that average driving behavior changes, so ratings become outdated. The EPA ini-
tiated the rating system in 1978, but then adjusted all ratings in the mid-1980s to account
for the fact that on-road use consistently underperformed relative to the ocial estimates.
Highway ratings were uniformly reduced to 78% of their previous levels, and city ratings
were reduced to 90% of the original values.
In 2008, the EPA determined that an overhaul of the rating system was necessary to
correct further inaccuracies. Over time, average highway speeds, the distribution of city
versus highway driving, and the use of energy consuming features like air conditioning have
changed dramatically in the population, making the old test inaccurate. For example, the
EPA's highway test had a maximum speed of 55 miles-per-hour, a gross underestimate of
today's highway speeds. The EPA determined that it required an entirely new test procedure
35based on ve dierent tests, rather than the original two. This new battery of tests is
currently being phased in and the revised ratings are being used to create new label ratings
on vehicle stickers.
When these revisions have been undertaken, the updated values have been used to create
the fuel economy labels that consumers see when they purchase a new vehicle, but the orig-
inal, inaccurate ratings are still used for CAFE and fuel economy taxes like the Gas Guzzler
Tax. Presumably, the reason for this is that changing CAFE and tax policy will create
winners and losers, which necessitates a political process of compromise and compensation.
To avoid this, the government chose to continue using a less accurate system. The welfare
implications of this are described in Sallee (2010), who shows how to characterize the social
welfare loss from using mismeasured values and describes the degree of mismeasurement in
the fuel economy program. In principle, ratings could be corrected so they are accurate on
average as driving changes over time, but in practice the original ratings become ossied.
Yet one more reason that fuel economy taxation is imprecise is that it cannot adjust to
the gasoline content of fuel. Virtually all gasoline sold in the United States now contains
between 5 and 10% ethanol, and exible-fuel vehicles are capable of running on E85, which
is 85% ethanol and 15% gasoline. If two vehicles with identical fuel economy ratings use
fuel with dierent average ethanol shares, then these two vehicles will represent dierent
gasoline consumption and emissions proles, even if they are driven in identical manners.
Fuel economy taxes cannot account for this.
Fuel economy tax policies do not adjust to the driving patterns of individuals, so that
driving heterogeneity necessarily creates idiosyncratic variation in the tax or subsidy imposed
per gallon of gasoline in a fuel economy tax. Average inaccuracies may also exist. And, fuel
economy taxes cannot account for variation in the gasoline content of motor fuel. In contrast,
a gasoline tax would automatically adjust for all of these things without requiring policy-
makers to gather new detailed information. Put simply, it is much harder to correctly design
a fuel economy tax than it is to correctly design a direct tax on fuel.
368 Other justications for fuel economy regulation
The preceding discussion focuses on the eciency of fuel economy taxation as a tool for
reducing gasoline consumption in the presence of fully rational consumers. Some advocates
of fuel economy taxation argue that consumers are not fully rational in their valuation of
fuel economy and that this creates an additional eciency benet from taxation. Another
possibility is that the goal of fuel economy taxation is not to reduce gasoline directly but
rather to promote new technologies that will subsequently achieve gasoline conservation in
the future, through technological spill-overs or network eects. Yet another possibility is
that fuel economy tax policy has desirable redistributive properties. The implications for
fuel economy tax policy of these ulterior motives are explored here.
8.1 Do equity considerations justify fuel economy taxation?
The gasoline tax, taken in isolation, is regressive in the United States { lower income house-
holds spend a larger fraction of their household income on gasoline than do more wealthy
households, a fact which can be shown directly by looking at expenditure data. Might fuel
economy taxes be less regressive? Is this a reason to prefer them over gasoline taxes?
New car buyers are wealthier than average because lower income households tend to buy
used vehicles. Within the set of new car buyers, however, the relationship between income
and fuel economy is not clear a priori. No empirical studies of the incidence of a full-scale
feebate program exist, but West (2004) compares the distributional consequences of gasoline
taxes to those of a tax on vehicle size, which is functionally very similar to a fuel economy
tax. West (2004) nds that a tax on size is signicantly more regressive than a gasoline tax.
In addition, the regressivity of gasoline taxes is less clear than it initially appears. Poterba
(1991) shows that when households are ordered according to their total consumption instead
of total income, middle income households consume more gasoline than lower or upper
income households. Moreover, the revenue from a gasoline tax can be rebated in lump-sum
37fashion back to consumers to undo regressivity (Bento, Goulder, Jacbosen and von Haefen
2009; West 2004). Thus, given the exibility to adjust other policies, the ecient gasoline
tax should be preferred even if it has poor redistributive consequences because these can
be eciently undone. Even in the absence of this exibility, however, the existing research,
while incomplete, suggests that fuel economy taxation will not be more progressive than a
gasoline tax, which casts doubt on an equity justication for fuel economy taxation.
8.2 Does consumer bias justify fuel economy taxation?
Many people believe that consumers undervalue fuel economy. Several types of evidence
fuel this belief: consumers appear confused about the nonlinear relationship between fuel
costs and fuel economy ratings (Larrick and Soll 2008); car shoppers have a poor ability to
recite the components necessary to do a proper valuation (Turrentine and Kurani 2007); and
econometric estimates of implicit discount rates imply myopic valuations (Hausman 1979;
Dubin and McFadden 1984).
If consumers do not fully value fuel economy, then the relative eciency of a gasoline
tax over fuel economy taxes (or fuel economy regulation) may be lost because fuel taxes
shift consumer vehicle choice by increasing the value of fuel eciency. As a result, some
advocate fuel economy taxes or regulation on the grounds of consumer fallibility (see Greene,
Patterson, Singh and Li (2005) for an example and Greene (2010) and Helfand and Wolverton
(2009) for literature reviews).
To test for consumer fallibility, researchers have sought to understand how vehicle prices
respond to gasoline price changes. If consumers fully value fuel economy, economic theory
makes sharp predictions about how the relative prices of ecient and inecient vehicles
should change when gasoline prices move. Results have been mixed, with Kilian and Sims
(2006) nding signicant underadjustment, Allcott and Wozny (2009) nding modest un-
deradjustment, and Sallee, West and Fan (2009) and Busse, Knittel and Zettelmeyer (2009)
nding full adjustment.
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direct fuel taxation. Fischer, Harrington and Parry (2007) show that consumer underval-
uation must be severe in order for fuel economy taxation (or regulation) to be a desired
strategy, given the other ineciencies it creates. While the literature on consumer valuation
of fuel economy is not completely settled, evidence thus far indicates that it is unlikely that
undervaluation is sucient to overcome the other drawbacks of fuel economy taxation.
8.3 Do technology spill-overs justify fuel economy taxation?
Some fuel economy tax policies target specic new technologies. This is an inecient way
to motivate short-run gasoline conservation, but it could be an ecient approach if there
are technological spill-overs or other market failures. If the initial introduction of a new
technology generates spill-overs across automakers, then it might be ecient to subsidize a
technology because the benets extend beyond the manufacturer doing the initial research
and deployment. The phase-out provision in the Hybrid Vehicle Tax Credit and the Plug-in
Hybrid Tax Credit is sometimes purported to do just this { it fosters early innovation but
withdraws the subsidy once initial innovation is brought to market.
Technological applications are all patented, however, so it is not clear that one au-
tomaker's development of a technology will have spill-overs to other rms. Toyota holds
over 1,000 patents related to the use of hybrid technology, and they license various proce-
dures to other automakers including Nissan, Ford and Fuji Heavy Industries (Rowley 2006).
If the benets of research and deployment of a new technology are captured by the innovator,
then there is little reason to suspect a market failure that justies intervention.
Moreover, in practice, the amount of money that ows to automakers from these subsidies
is quite small compared to the cost of developing a new model that utilizes a new power
train. And, these policies have been put into law only once the technologies are market
ready. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the subsidies could prove pivotal in determining
whether or not an automaker chose to investigate a particular technology or chose to design
39a new model to use a dierent power train. Instead, tax subsidies for hybrids, plug-ins or
all-electric models probably act as windfall gains to automakers that oset a modest portion
of the research and design costs of building a new model.
8.4 Do network eects justify fuel economy taxation?
A slightly dierent eciency argument relates to network eects. Consumer demand for a
new technology may be a function of the market penetration of that technology if there are
positive network eects. Network eects could stem either from information dispersion {
the more hybrid owners there are the less uncertainty others have about the technology {
or from economies of scale in maintenance { the rst owners of a new technology may have
trouble nding qualied repair services.
Heutel and Muehlegger (2010) argue that this is indeed the case for hybrid vehicles.
They show that states that had many early Prius sales saw more rapid diusion of hybrids
in the future, and, conversely, states with many early sales of the Honda Insight had slower
diusion. They interpret this as evidence that consumers were uncertain of the merits of
hybrid vehicles, and Priuses { which ended up being enormously popular { sent a positive
signal about the technology whereas Insights { which were not commercially successful and
were discontinued even as they hybrid market took o { sent a negative signal.
If early sales of a new technology resolve uncertainty and accelerate diusion, there could
be a role for government subsidies. But, the divergence of the Prius and the Insight highlights
the problems with such an approach. We only wish to subsidize the high quality version
of the technology { in other words, we only want to subsidize the vehicles that could be
commercially viable on their own in the future, but there is no way for policy-makers to
make that distinction in advance.
In sum, it seems dicult to make an eciency case for the types of policies passed in
recent years. These policies do not appear particularly well suited for correcting identiable
market failures. It is possible that these policies have some eciency role tied to technological
40spill-overs, network eects or consumer bias, but there is limited evidence to support such
a claim. Alternatively, they can best be understood as the politically feasible policy option,
which is theoretically inferior to direct fuel taxation but politically palatable.
9 Open questions and lessons for future policy
The preceding analysis points to several lessons for policy. First, fuel economy taxation as it
is practiced is a crude instrument for achieving gasoline conservation. If the primary aim of
a policy is to reduce gasoline consumption in the United States so as to reduce reliance on
fossil fuels, improve local air quality and mitigate global climate change, direct fuel taxation
will deliver greater benet per dollar of social cost.
Second, fuel economy taxation as it is practiced invites gaming through short-run in-
tertemporal shifting, medium-run vehicle tweaking, and long-run relabeling of vehicles as
light trucks. All three practices represent costly manipulation that improves tax treatment
without necessarily reducing the consumption of gasoline. Policy-makers could eliminate
the rst by introducing fuel economy taxes as surprises, as was done in Canada's feebate
program. They could eliminate the second by using smooth tax schedules instead of notched
ones. They could eliminate the third by removing the preferential treatment of light trucks.
A third lesson is that these policies do impact eet fuel economy. Automakers and
consumers do respond to tax incentives. This response is, however, likely to be achieved
in a more cost eective manor by direct taxation of fuel. That said, the fuel economy tax
programs that have been instituted in the past have had large taxes and subsidies per vehicle,
but they have aected a small percentage of the market. We do not have any large scale fuel
economy tax programs that have inuenced the majority of the market to study.
Even if fuel economy taxation may be an inecient tool for reducing gasoline consumption
in the near-term, there might be an eciency motivation based on technological spill-overs or
network eects. Or, fuel economy taxes might be justied by consumer mis-valuation of fuel
41economy. To date, however, existing research has provided scant support for these alternative
motivations for fuel economy taxation. Further research in these areas is warranted.
Overall, the eciency case for using fuel economy taxation as an ideal tool is weak
for all of the same reasons that the case for fuel economy regulation over fuel taxation is
weak. Instead, its existence likely owes more to political expediency than the theoretical
ideal. Nevertheless, if policy-makers continue to use fuel economy taxation, then signicant
eciency gains can still be made by eliminating policy notches that lead to wasteful gaming.
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